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ALTERNATIVE WORDINGS TO THE PRESENT
GENERAL AVIATION INSURANCE POLICIES
PAUL W. ENGSTROM*
INTRODUCTION
At the present time there are over a dozen different insurance
policies available to the pilot who owns his own aircraft or uses
that of someone else for his personal or business purposes.1 These
policies tend to contain in one form or another basically the same
terms and conditions, but they are not identical, and the variances
and interpretations thereof create innumerable controversies which
frequently require litigation for ultimate resolution.' While it may
seem self-defeating for one whose livelihood to some extent is
causally related to such controversies to attempt in a small way
to counteract this, the opportunity to expound on a new approach
to general aviation insurance is difficult to pass up.
The scope of this topic is narrower than the term "general avia-
tion" implies. Herein, the term is limited to those individual or
corporate insureds who own or use one or more aircraft solely for
their own "business and pleasure."' It does not include-nor can
* LL.B., DePaul Univ. College of Law; member, California Bar, Illinois Bar,
American Bar Association, Federation of Insurance Counsel.
'A selective sampling of such insurers, by company or managing agents, in-
cludes Underwriters at Lloyds, London [AV16 and AV20]; Associated Aviation
Underwriters; Avemco Insurance Company; Aviation Office of America (Ranger,
etc.); Crump Aviation Underwriters (Monarch); Cravens, Dargan & Company
(Republic); Insurance Company of North America; International Aviation Un-
derwriters (U. S. Fire); National Aviation Underwriters; Omni Aviation Man-
agers; Pacific Aviation Managers; Southeastern Aviation Underwriters; and United
States Aircraft Insurance Group.
'According to one authoritative source on aviation law in the United States,
there were forty reported decisions dealing with coverage issues during the period
from 1974 through 1976. See 13 Av. Cas. (CCH) (1974-1976).
' The term "business and pleasure" is limited in our standard policy to those
purposes for which no charge is made which is intended to result in financial
profit to the insured. See Item 6 of Application/Declarations.
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it be adapted for-fixed base operators whose purposes include
sales, charter, rental, flight instruction, or the like; or flying clubs;
or the more involved types of "industrial aid."
The proposed policy is offered as a means of generating discus-
sion and to emphasize certain areas which each of the policy's
authors' believes are of particular importance. Because of our vary-
ing backgrounds, it is difficult to say what the underlying "under-
writing intent" is, and the reader should not attempt to impose one
on the policy's terms. No suggestion is made as to what premiums
should be charged for a policy such as this, and no warranties are
made as to whether such a policy is marketable. The sole aim is
to set out in clear and understandable terms those individual cover-
ages which are available and to delineate specifically those the
insured wishes to purchase.
The proposed "standardized" policy presupposes that standard-
ization is a proper course of action, and obviously there are a
great number of questions which must be resolved in reaching any
conclusion on the desirability of such a policy.5 However, it is not
the purpose here to pass judgment on standardization, and this
suggestion of policy terms should not be considered as an indica-
tion of a preference in this regard.
GENERAL CONCEPTS
Because an insurance policy is a contract, requiring an unam-
biguous offer and an equally unambiguous acceptance, the per-
vading and overriding purpose behind the proposed changes in
this proffered policy and those presently in use is to force the in-
sured to consider carefully what his insurance needs are and to
require him to confirm this with the insurer in a manner which
eliminates future controversies.
41 wish to thank Tom Davis and Fred McLemore for allowing me the oppor-
tunity to participate in this project. While at times in the past we have been ad-
versaries in coverage disputes and other controversies, our general philosophies
regarding this policy's scope and breadth have generally been compatible, and
it has been a labor of love for me to work closely with them in this positive man-
ner.
Among the more obvious questions regarding standardization are (I) the
acceptability of same by the federal and state governmental bureaus concerned
with anti-trust violations, (2) the differing underwriting philosophies of the vari-
ous insurers, (3) the necessity for "tailoring" a policy to meet particular needs
in a specific state, and (4) the educational process with insureds who believe they
are entitled to a different policy than their neighbor, for whatever reason.
AGREEMENTS AND DECLARATIONS
Inevitably, when an insurer has a clear and valid reason for
declining coverage for a loss because it was not covered, the in-
surer will argue (1) that he misunderstood what the coverage was,
(2) that the scope of the coverage was misrepresented to him by
the insurer or its agent, or (3) that the policy was not written as
requested by the insured. The insurer's plight in such arguments is
worsened by the courts in many states which impose incredible
burdens on insurers to prove that the insured did not misunder-
stand or that the insurer did not misrepresent the coverage."
Under such circumstances, the policy terms must be precise,
unalterable, and detailed, and, if possible, the insured must be
forced to acknowledge them in writing to avoid a later change of
heart. This general thought can be seen throughout the insuring
agreements, definitions, and declarations.
INSURING AGREEMENTS-TRADITIONAL COVERAGES
The proposed policy language is broken down into two general
areas, the traditional coverages and the modified coverages. Cover-
ages A through F, and X and Y, are the traditional, whereas cov-
erages G through J are of the modified variety.
Two items are particularly unusual in the proposed traditional
coverages. First, the insurers unequivocally and clearly state that
their agreement to indemnify the insured is only for compensatory
damages and not punitive or exemplary damages. Secondly, the
scope of coverage for single-limit liability is broken down into two
categories to eliminate any later suggestion that the wrong cover-
age was provided.
The question of coverage for punitive or exemplary damages
still is the subject of great debate.7 In California, it is the consensus
I In California, for instance, we have several cases imposing the duty to defend
upon an insurer under tenuous circumstances. See, e.g., the infamous "reasonable
expectations" rule in Gray v. Zurich Ins. Co., 65 Cal. 2d 263, 419 P.2d 168, 54
Cal. Rptr. 104 (1966), and one of its most recent progeny, Val's Painting &
Drywall, Inc. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 53 Cal. App. 3d 576, 126 Cal. Rptr. 267 (1975).
'See, e.g., Conley & Bishop, Punitive Damages and the General Liability In-
surance Policy, 25 FED. INS. COUNSEL Q. 309 (1975); Gonsoulin, Is an Award of
Punitive Damages Covered Under an Automobile or Comprehensive Liability
Policy?, 22 Sw. L.J. 433 (1968); Haskell, Punitive Damages: The Public Policy
and the Insurance Policy, 58 ILL. B.J. 780 (1970); Long, Insurance Protection
Against Punitive Damages, 32 TENN. L. REV. 573 (1965); Oshins, Should Puni-
tive Damages be Within the Coverage of Liability Insurance, 5 FORUM 78 (1969);
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of the defense bar that its civil and insurance codes prohibit an
insurer from indemnifying for such damages. However, other
jurisdictions have held to the contrary,' arguing generally that an
insurer's agreement to pay "all sums which the Insured shall be-
come legally obligated to pay as damages" is not specific enough
to preclude coverage for punitive damages.
In light of the controversy generated by punitive damages and
the burden they can create on an insurer in light of the "bad faith"-
excess judgment scythe hanging over insurers' heads for failure
to settle within policy limits,"0 a clear statement of the extent to
which the insurers indemnify the insured seems appropriate. Cer-
tainly the most conspicuous place for this statement is the very
agreement which creates the obligation upon the insurer.
The second divergence from the customary policy language is
the creation of coverages D and E, rather than the combination of
them into one coverage with the resulting interlineation of "ex"
or "in" to answer the question of whether passenger liability is
provided. Typically, where single-limit coverage is available, some
means is provided for the company to state whether passengers are
to be covered. Moreover, where such coverage exists, any limita-
tion to the liability for passenger bodily injury is stated in the
endorsements and not on the face sheet of the Declarations them-
Note, Insurance for Punitive Damages: A Reevaluation, 28 HASTINGS L.J. 431
(1976); Annot., 20 A.L.R.3d 343 (1968).
'Punitive or exemplary damages are available in California only when not
based on a contract and when the conduct is malicious, oppressive, or fraudulent,
CAL. CIv. CODE § 3294 (West 1973). Pursuant to CAL. Civ. CODE § 1668 (West
1973), a party cannot contract to indemnify for such conduct: "All contracts
which have for their object, directly or indirectly, to exempt anyone from re-
sponsibility for his own fraud, or willful injury to the person or property of
another, . . . are against the policy of the law." See also Evans v. Pacific Indem.
Co., 49 Cal. App. 3d 537, 122 Cal. Rptr. 680 (1975); Tomerlin v. Canadian
Indem. Co., 61 Cal. 2d 638, 394 P.2d 173, 39 Cal. Rptr. 731 (1964).
'E.g., Glen Falls Indem. Co. v. Atlantic Bldg. Corp., 199 F.2d 60 (4th Cir.
1952) [South Carolina]; Concord Gen. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Hills, 345 F. Supp. 1090
(S.D. Me. 1972); Price v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 108 Ariz. 485, 502
P.2d 522 (1972); Abbie Uriguen Oldsmobile Buick, Inc. v. United States Fire
Ins. Co., 95 Idaho 501, 511 P.2d 783 (1973); Lazenby v. Universal Underwriters
Ins. Co., 214 Tenn. 639, 383 S.W.2d 1 (1964).
10 Once again, California leads the way, but many jurisdictions have followed.
See, e.g., Beck v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 54 Cal. App. 3d 347, 126 Cal.
Rptr. 602 (1976); Cain v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 47 Cal. App. 3d 783,
121 Cal. Rptr. 200 (1975); Crisci v. Security Ins. Co., 66 Cal. 2d 435, 426 P.2d
173, 58 Cal. Rptr. 13 (1967).
AGREEMENTS AND DECLARATIONS
selves, creating yet another fertile field for arguing misunderstand-
ing, misrepresentation, or misprint by the insurer.
In an effort to eliminate this problem, two "single-limit" cover-
ages are created, one specifically excluding occupants and one in-
cluding occupants. Moreover, where occupants are covered, the
"Application/Declarations," Item 6, provides within its terms for
a limitation upon the exposure for each occupant. This becomes
particularly significant when one considers that the named insured
must acknowledge that this is the coverage he wants by signing
the Application/Declarations.
A review of the other provisions of the traditional portions of
the insuring agreements will reveal other minor changes." How-
ever, they conform generally with those in common use.
INSURING AGREEMENTS-MODIFIED COVERAGES AVAILABLE
As indicated, the traditional aviation policies provide liability
and full coverages for the operation, maintenance, or use of the
aircraft specified in the policy. Then, in varying manners, insurers
agree to cover the insured for "use of other aircraft," "temporary
use of substitute aircraft," and "newly-acquired aircraft." Since the
usual policy form is used for the entire spectrum of general avia-
tion, as opposed to the very limited scope of the proposed policy,
the language of these "add-on" coverages is quite broad and some-
times unclear. In addition, these forms of coverage usually contain
within the paragraph devoted to it all the terms on which coverage
is based.
Keeping in mind the purpose of the proposed policy, it is sub-
mitted that the specification of additional coverages for non-owned
aircraft, available only to the named insured, is a better approach.
Thus, the proposed policy has incorporated into it coverages G,
H, I, and J, all being liability/indemnification coverages which the
insured can purchase to protect himself while operating a "stand-
ard" fixed-wing aircraft which is the property of others.
The expansion of the concept of "non-ownership" coverage
forces the named insured to consider at the inception of the policy
whether he wants to be insured for using someone else's aircraft,
"Note the inclusion in Coverage 4 of the term "theft" in the coverage. All
policies, I think, assume that a theft constitutes a loss of the aircraft, but the in-
clusion of the term explicitly should be of some assistance.
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whether a substitute airplane for his own or a rental from a fixed-
base operator. Moreover, it allows the insurer to secure an appro-
priate premium for this coverage, where in the past it has been
incorporated into the broader scope of the "Insuring Agreements"
without an appropriate charge. These particular coverages parallel
those generally available for the aircraft covered by the policy,
except that no "single-limit" coverage is available.
Coverage J, dealing with aircraft liability, requires proof by the
owner/insurer of the aircraft that the named insured was liable for
the damage, rather than providing first-party coverage to the
named insured for this damage. With the ever-broadening concepts
of comparative negligence, contribution and indemnity, and prod-
ucts liability," situations arise where the pilot may not be totally
responsible for the damage. Basing the insurer's obligation on proof
of his responsibility should result in payments of less than the
policy limits in numerous cases.
As to the amount of coverage for non-owned aircraft liability,
no provisions are contained in the policy limiting the named in-
sured to the type of aircraft in Item 5 of the Application/Declara-
tions. It is contemplated that a named insured would not request
coverage beyond the value of his own aircraft, and if he did, that
the insurer would insist upon a pilot clause which would place
adequate currency requirements on the pilot for all aircraft flown
-as a means of protecting the insurer.
The modified coverages also contain the limiting language on
the obligation of insurers to indemnify a named insured for com-
pensatory damages only. The same reasoning propounded above
;applies equally to these coverages.
INSURING AGREEMENTS-DUTY TO DEFEND
Paragraph 2 of the Insuring Agreements contains those provi-
sions concerned with defense, settlement, and supplementary pay-
12 Stambaugh v. Superior Court, 62 Cal. App. 3d 231, 132 Cal. Rptr. 843
.(1976); E.B. Wills Co. v. Superior Court, 56 Cal. App. 3d 650, 128 Cal. Rptr.
541 (1976); Li v. Yellow Cab Co., 13 Cal. 3d 804, 532 P.2d 1226, 119 Cal.
Rptr. 858 (1975). The California Supreme Court has accepted for hearing two
-other appellate cases reaching conflicting results on the issue of comparing the
,negligence of defendants, and its decision should decide the fate of contribution
.among tortfeasors in California.
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ments. Of primary importance is subparagraph A, which sets out
the insurer's agreement to defend the insured.
The "duty to defend" is a contractually created obligation,
although the courts in many states treat it at times as an unlimited
responsibility which flows from insurers to insureds'." Moreover,
traditionally, the duty to defend is unlimited and continues beyond
that time at which the insurer would like to pay its policy limits
and extricate itself from the expenses of litigation. These two prob-
lems are addressed in the text of subparagraph A.
With respect to the limitation upon the duty to defend, the
language of this provision states that the insurer will "defend any
claim or suit covered by this insurance... whether groundless or
not .... " This language is not necessarily new, and the key prob-
lem as to the determination of whether or not the loss is covered
must be made on an individual claim basis. However, while such
a determination is being made-through declaratory relief, arbi-
tration, or the like-the concluding portion of the provision clearly
allows the insurer to proceed under a reservation of rights, thereby
preserving its position on the coverage issues." By incorporating
this into the contract, an insured can no longer refuse to allow
a defense under reservation of rights without breaching the terms
of this contractual agreement between the parties."
1 Again, California offers a very good example of the lengths to which the
courts will go to define the defense clause in an insurance policy. In the now
famous (or infamous, depending on your point of view) case of Gray v. Zurich
Ins. Co., 65 Cal. 2d 263, 419 P.2d 168, 54 Cal. Rptr. 104 (1966), the California
Supreme Court ruled that the insurers enjoyed such a stronger bargaining position
that the policy had to be considered a "contract of adhesion," and it insisted that
the courts had to protect the downtrodden by interpreting policies by the "reason-
able expectations" of the insured. The latter, of course, invariably means that the
insured expected the policy to provide a defense for any claim. In Val's Painting
& Drywall, Inc. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 53 Cal. App. 3d 576, 126 Cal. Rptr. 267
(1975), the court ruled that the duty to defend is broader than the duty to in-
demnify and that if there is any basis under the facts of the complaint for finding
coverage, a defense is required, whether or not the facts were groundless, false,
or fraudulent. Thus, in California, at least, the duty to defend exists in situations
in which traditionally the insurer would not expect to have any obligation.
"The concept of a defense under a reservation of rights or a non-waiver
agreement is particularly important where the "duty to defend" is interpreted in
a liberal manner, since the preclusion of such a defense could constitute a waiver
of the coverage dispute and greatly extend the scope of the policy and the obliga-
tion to settle. This was recognized in the Val's Painting decision, 53 Cal. App. 3d
576, 126 Cal. Rptr. 267 (1975).
15 It is respectfully submitted that an insured's refusal to allow a defense under
reservation of rights constitutes "bad faith," which estops the insured from assert-
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The problem of the defense after tender of policy limits is ad-
dressed in this subparagraph and also in Condition 2 applicable
to the liability coverages. In both instances, the ins'urer reiterates
that it agrees to defend, but only until it elects to pay its policy
limits, at which time the duty to defend ceases. Thus, the situation
where policy limits are relatively low but the expenses of litiga-
tion are ten-fold higher should no longer occur. Payment of the
policy limits extinguishes the duty to defend and thereby establishes
a means of precluding further costs or fees.
INSURING AGREEMENTS-MISCELLANEOUS THOUGHTS
The term "Insured" in the proposed policy generally comports
with the traditional omnibus definition of all permissive users with
certain exceptions. The inclusion of the exceptions in this Insuring
Agreement seems preferable to the incorporation of the exceptions
into the "Exclusions." These exceptions deal solely with who will
be insured and properly belong in the provision wherein the insurer
states the definition of the term upon which coverage for them is
predicated.
Exception (D) of paragraph 3 makes an exception to the omni-
bus definition of Insured for persons operating the aircraft for any
purpose for which a charge is made which is intended to result in
financial profit to the named insured. This exception is parallel
to the "uses" clause contained in Item 6 of the Application/
Declarations and reflects the true spirit and nature of this cover-
age-the business and pleasure policy for the general aviation
pilot.
Of particular note is the rather stringent restriction on the
territory in which the aircraft can be flown. On reflection, perhaps
even the present wording is too broad, and the territory should
be limited solely to the continental United States. The basis for
such a limitation is that the risk can perhaps be evaluated more
readily if the states or countries of operation are reasonably limited.
Also, operation of an aircraft in Hawaii or Alaska, or in Canada or
ing that the insurer has waived policy defenses if it then provides a defense with-
out reservation, due to the insured's coercion. There is no reason why the "cove-
nant of fair dealing," which is imposed upon insurers to require them to settle
within policy limits or pay the excess amount, should not also be imposed upon
the insured when the insurer attempts to invoke the only protection he has re-
maining.
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Mexico, can be covered readily through endorsement, thereby
allowing the insurer to decide if it wants to write insurance which
could lead to claims in those jurisdictions, and if so, at what
price.
DEFINITIONS
Two words are of particular import: "occupant" and "occur-
rence."
The traditional language in aircraft liability policies speaks of
"passenger" or "non-passenger" coverage, and that term is defined
in some policies to specifically exclude the pilot or crew members,
while in other policies the exclusion is implicit. However, the
question of whether the term "passenger" and pilot or crew are
mutually exclusive has been the subject of a great deal of litigation,
some courts saying they are exclusive" and others holding they are
not."' To avoid this controversy, it is necessary as an insurer to
decide to cover all occupants of the aircraft or none of them, and
thus the more inclusive and neutral term "occupant" is chosen."
Until recently, the term "occurrence" has meant an accident or
happening resulting in bodily injury during the policy period, and
there was little question but that the injury was the determinative
date. However, the traditional definition has now been tortured in
at least one jurisdiction, and, unfortunately, others are sure to
follow. In Sylla v. United States Fidelity and Guaranty Co.,"' the
"Spiess v. United Services Life, 348 F.2d 275 (10th Cir. 1965) (based on
Maryland law and statute defining passenger as one having no part in the opera-
tion of the aircraft); St. Paul Mercury v. Price, 359 F.2d 74 (5th Cir. 1966);
United Services Life v. Delaney, 358 F.2d 714 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S.
846 (1966); Kinnavy v. Traill, 56 Mich. App. 370, 223 N.W.2d 741 (1974).
See also Ranger Ins. Co. v. Mathews, 281 So. 2d 345 (Fla. 1973) (quashing 267
So. 2d 867 and remanding for further proceedings), in which the policy definition
of passenger excluded pilot or crew. The Florida Supreme Court concluded, as
had the trial court, that a student pilot was neither a member of the crew nor
a passenger and was therefore entitled to coverage; it thus quashed the district
court's reversal of the trial court.
17 Continental Cas. Co. v. Warren, 152 Tex. 164, 254 S.W.2d 762 (1953).
1s If it is the insurer's desire to exclude coverage for the pilot, this can be done
by incorporating into the Exclusions an item making the policy inapplicable "to
the bodily injury, sickness, disease, or death of any person who is an Insured
under this policy." Due to the limited purposes under this policy for which the
aircraft can be used, it is difficult to conceive of a situation where there would
otherwise be coverage and the pilot was not an Insured.
1954 Cal. App. 3d 895, 127 Cal. Rptr. 38 (1976).
19771
JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE
California Court of Appeal held that since the term "accident"
did not specifically state that the injury was the causative event,
the term could be interpreted to mean an event sometime prior to
the injury (coincidentally within the policy period) which allegedly
was a proximate result thereof."
To avoid this difficulty in the future, the proposed definition of
"occurrence" is keyed solely to the happening of a bodily injury,
etc., during the policy period. The reemphasis of this intent in
the second sentence should remove any doubt as to the event on
which a determination of an occurrence is predicated.
APPLICATION/DECLARATIONS
The most significant manifestation of the purpose for the pro-
posed changes is in the form of the document known as the
"Application/Declarations." As stated above, an insured's last-
ditch attempt to create coverage which does not otherwise exist is
to claim mistake, *misrepresentation, misunderstanding, or the like.
This document is an attempt to thwart such an effort and to allow
the parties to the contract to avoid such controversies.
It is contemplated that an insured would be required either to
fill out this application-including the coverages desired, the air-
craft insured, and the pilot requirements--or to execute the appli-
cation after it was prepared by the insurer or a broker prior to the
effective date of the policy. Such a requirement is similar to that
involving the medical questionnaire which is signed and becomes
part of a life insurance policy, and it is a representation by the
named insured of his understanding of the basic policy terms.As elaborated upon previously, each of the coverages is listed
separately and the premium therefor stated. The named insured by
necessity must know, or be presumed to know, what his insurer's
limits of liability are, and thus he cannot argue after a bad claim
that he intended to have $1,000,000.00 when in fact the Applica-
20 d. at 900, 127 Cal. Rptr. 40. The ramifications are obvious. Assume a
named insured sells his aircraft on June 1, 1976, cancels his policy on June 2,
1976, and is later sued in 1979 for an accident involving his former airplane in
1978. The suit would arise from the "ownership" or maintenance of the aircraft,
and under the Sylla doctrine, it is arguable that the "occurrence" was the sale
or maintenance during the policy period, irrespective of when the injury occurred.
Thus, the insurer's duty to defend or indemnify would never be extinguished.
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tion/Declarations executed by him states his desire for coverage
of $100,000.00.
It may be that such an approach is not feasible in light of the
logistics of an aviation insurance company, particularly consider-
ing the vast volume of paperwork needed to secure quotes, process
applications, issue policies, and handle claims. However, with the
simplicity of operations advanced by such marvels as the Xerox
5000 or IBM Copier H, it does not seem to be an impossible task
to require a named insured to sign an Application and incorporate
that into the policy as the Declarations, particularly when one con-
siders the great benefits to be derived.
Of the specific items in the Application/Declarations, the most
significant is Item 6, "Purpose of Use." It should be noted that
only one use is allowed, namely, the business and pleasure of the
insured. No longer does the policy allow the insured to request,
or the insurer to allow, other types of coverage, such as "Indus-
trial Aid," "Limited Commercial," "Commercial," or "Other."
This again is a reflection of the limited nature of the policy and its
unadaptability to other purposes.
The second feature of this provision is the reliance on "financial
profit" as the sole criterion for determining whether the use is
within the phrase "business and pleasure." Numerous policies at-
tempt to define "business ' as those uses other than those "for which
a charge is made," followed by a rather lengthy definition of that
term. 1 The essence of these definitions is that the insured is not
expected to secure a financial profit from the operation of the air-
craft. The proposed limitation on the term "business" deals with
this more directly and thus, it is hoped, eliminates much of the
confusion which can arise.2
21 One leading policy says the following in explaining the phrase "for which
a charge is made":
Purchase of fuel and oil for the aircraft by a person using the air-
craft gratuitously for a specific flight, a pro rata sharing between
passengers of the actual expense of fuel and oil during operation of
the aircraft on a specific flight, or reimbursement of the named in-
sured by his employer on a mileage or hours flown basis for actual
expenses incurred in the named insured's operation of the aircraft
in the course of his employment are the only exceptions not deemed
a charge under this definition.
12See, e.g., Pacific Indem. Co. v. Acel Delivery Serv., 485 F.2d 1169 (5th
Cir. 1973) [Texas]; Fidelity & Cas. Co. of N.Y. v. Crist, 248 Ark. 1010, 455
S.W.2d 904 (1970); Christensen v. State Farm Auto Ins. Co., 52 Haw. 80, 470
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CONCLUSION
As indicated at the outset, the proposed policy language is solely
a means of expressing positively those aspects of the present
language which should be analyzed and reconsidered. No doubt
many controversies would be created by use of the proffered
language, and those who deal with aircraft liability and hull poli-
cies can find ways to improve upon these suggestions.
However, there can be no mistaking the need for such a re-
examination. The age of "consumerism" has compelled it, although
the lengths to which courts have gone to thwart the clear intent of
the policy for the benefit of the insured causes one to conclude
that this may be a "Don Quixotian" task. There is no question but
that portions of various policies are ambiguous, but it is equally
clear that many of the so-called ambiguities discussed in the de-
cisions today are nothing more than a contorted exercise in illogic
by counsel representing the insured's interests to the fullest.
The windmills will be with us until such time as a more even-
handed approach to coverage disputes is developed. In the mean-
time, a constant effort to improve insurance language must be
maintained. One federal judge rendered the following indictment
of the aviation insurance industry in finding against an insurer on
a coverage issue:
The clumps of words in an insurance policy might seem like so
much insignificant jabberwocky to those who follow insurance law,
perhaps worse to those who only stumble into the field. Jabber-
wocky it might be. Insignificant it is not. On those clumps of words
rests the intent of the insurance coverage. Some insurance policies,
their riders, exclusions, folds-in and folds-out, and appendages, are
festooned in such ways that mechanical knowledge is a help in
unfolding and laying them out so that the policies are in physically
readable form. An insured, who is presented with forms and dis-
cussion in widely varying degrees of clarity, is entitled to know the
precise nature of the insurance coverage that his premiums are
buying. It is all too clear that contract language, while at times a
great explainer, is at times a great obscurer. It is incumbent upon
P.2d 521 (1970); Cammack v. Avenico Ins. Co., 505 P.2d 348 (Ore. 1973);
Thompson v. Ezzell, 61 Wash. 2d 685, 379 P.2d 983 (1963).
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insurance companies to state clearly the perimeters of their cover-
age to those who entrust their security to them.'"
It is hoped that the above efforts will be of some assistance in
this endeavor.
2 Ranger Ins. Co. v. Culberson, 454 F.2d 857, 867 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
407 U.S. 916 (1971).
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